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By Mie Augier and Major Sean F. X. Barrett
This is the second part of our conversation series with General Anthony Zinni, USMC (ret.)
on leadership, strategy, learning, and the art and science of warfighting. Read Part One here.
In this installment, General Zinni shares his experiences with wargames, Desert Crossing
and Millennium Challenge 2002 in particular, and discusses how the differing objectives of
service chiefs and combatant commanders manifest in wargames. Gen Zinni then touches
on the U.S. military’s overreliance on technology and draws parallels from the business world
to inform approaches to great power competition.
What are some of the challenges to organizing effective wargames?
Zinni: When I was at Quantico, we started going through a phase where everybody was into
board games and tactical decision games, and that sort of thing became really popular—
parallel to maneuver warfare development. I came away with several impressions. I think
gaming was more valuable at the lower levels, at the tactical level, maybe lower operational
level. I think there you can construct the game in a way at the division level or below where
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nobody is promoting anything, and you can design games to learn specific things and bring
out specific points. As you go higher up, I found there was too much in the way of service
politics and other things that were injected into the games.
There are a lot of assumptions about capabilities that belie reality or truths and other factors.
For example, I found that when playing with the Army after they first introduced the Apache
helicopter, you couldn’t shoot down an Apache helicopter. No matter what you did, that was
impossible. They were defending the program, and they wanted to build it up.
When I was a two-star, I was in charge of the Marine Corps side in a game we used to do
with the Navy every year. The game was more designed to showcase what capabilities we
wanted and really focus on things where Navy-Marine Corps cooperation was needed to
gain the capabilities, either because of the way they had to be employed or because of the
way budgets work. It usually ended up being kind of a swap meet. We had to find
compromises because the budget wouldn’t support everybody’s wish list. When we went
through the massive Millennium Challenge games with Joint Forces Command, I watched
how the games became more designed as proofs of capabilities—preordained proofs of
capabilities—rather than—as much as they advertised it—open testing, having a real
willingness to fail, and all that.
If somebody talks about a game, I am usually highly suspicious about what the purpose is,
who is designing it, and who is sponsoring it. To me, that is critical. The other thing I found in
gaming is the intelligence guys always present you with the indestructible, undefeatable
enemy. They love to do that. You must overcome that to an extent.
What are some of your experiences that showed the value of wargaming?
Zinni: When I was Commander-in-Chief at U.S. Central Command, we were on-and-off
bombing Iraq when Saddam did not cooperate with the UN inspectors. At that time, if
Saddam didn’t cooperate, President Clinton immediately wanted to pull the UN inspector out
and hit Saddam. It always worked. Saddam brought the inspectors back in, so President
Clinton gave us the okay on anything we wanted to target, basically, you know, make it
painful. Since we knew these opportunities arose, we didn’t just want it to be haphazard
targeting. We deliberately targeted air defense systems. Although we couldn’t plan on when
he didn’t want to let inspectors in or when he’d give them a hard time, we had a systematic
way of taking down his air defense systems when these events occurred, and we were very
successful. President Clinton OK’d us bombing downtown Baghdad and taking down his
intelligence headquarters and a couple of other things. It was called Operation Desert Fox.
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Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, USMC, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central
Command, briefs reporters at the Pentagon, Dec. 21, 1998, on his
assessment of Operation Desert Fox, a four-day bombing campaign against
Iraq. (DoD photo by R. D. Ward)
Saddam knew when the inspectors left, he was going to get hit. In the past, we always had to
bring a few things in before we could launch strikes. One particular time, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs GEN Shelton asked me, “Could you do something so that virtually, as soon as
Richard Butler (who was the head of the UN inspection team) is out, you go?” And we did.
The battle damage assessment was phenomenal. Four days of strikes. The targets were
really large ones. We usually used either the Swiss or the Polish embassy in Baghdad to
give us feedback. Well, suddenly—and I’ll get to the gaming piece of this—they started
saying, “You guys have to know what you are doing here because this last set of strikes
really shook the Iraqi government. The normal hostile rhetoric afterward was gone. They
were shocked by the targets you hit, and there are all kinds of rumblings on the street.” We
were even getting some feedback that there were some Iraqi generals talking about taking
out Saddam if those kinds of strikes continued, and giving feelers to our allies, too.
The next thing that happened, I got calls from both Jordan and Kuwait saying they were
getting this feedback, too. Their worry was that if we struck the government to the point that it
was overthrown, or hit a target that shut down communications or whatever, they could see
major uprisings and then massive amounts of refugees streaming across their borders. I got
asked by the national leadership of both countries: What’s your plan if this happened?
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What’s your plan for massive refugee outflows? What’s your plan for a government that
totally collapses, which it could from your airstrikes, and the country becomes a mess? I
realized that our war plans were only designed to take out the Republican Guard and take
down the military structure. There was nothing in our war plans, or in what we were directed
to do, that talked about the post-kinetic period. I thought I could do my job—take out the
military—in less than three weeks. But who would be in charge of rebuilding Iraq or creating
a new government?
I sent a request up through the chain to the Department of Defense and Department of State
asking who had the aftermath plan. I had a feeling it was going to be a total mess. We
needed a post-kinetic plan that meshed with our military plan. Well, the answer we got is no
one was thinking about this. I asked if we could do a study on what Iraq would look like if the
government collapsed, or if we had to go in and take out the military. What kind of Iraq would
we find? The State Department, CIA, and all the intelligence organizations agreed to be
involved, and my chief of staff said, “Let’s contract a study.” We went to Booz Allen (BA), and
the BA people recommended we do a wargame instead of a study because as we
discovered things, what we were really after was: what are our options, what should we do?
You should put yourself in a position where you have to make those decisions, so you know
what kinds of decisions are necessary. Only a game can generate that.
I committed to a couple of weeks up in Washington so we could go through this. We did it,
and it is now declassified. It was called Desert Crossing. We went through the game, and I
was frankly shocked at what everybody’s consensus was—that when we went into Iraq to
take down the Republican Guard, that wouldn’t be very difficult at all. The problem we would
have, even with the forces we had in our war plans, which was overwhelming force and
which Rumsfeld threw away, was what happened after that. My intention was to get control of
everything right away. The one thing I learned in places like Somalia and elsewhere is if you
lose momentum, it is hard to get it back.
Unfortunately, the results of the wargame were that this place was going to come apart like a
cheap suitcase. I went back to the State Department and DoD and said, “Okay, we looked at
this, and this is what we see happening.” And by the way, everything out of that wargame is
exactly what happened when we did go in later. This wargame was in 1999, my last year at
CENTCOM, and no one was willing to stand up and plan. The State Department wasn’t
going to own up to it. They did not want to get involved in the planning. Nobody else at DoD
or anybody else wanted to take this on. I told my people that if this were to happen, either
because there was an intentional decision to go into Iraq, or because of our airstrikes and
everything we were doing, and the country internally imploded, we would be forced to go in,
so let’s plan for it.
My chief of staff said, “You know, a lot of this stuff we are looking at is not us. We don’t
rebuild governments, and we don’t know how to build economic systems and all that.” I said I
didn’t care. We were going to plan and assume we’d have to take it on. I said, if nothing else,
we might not be able to understand what had to be done, but we could at least help identify
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the problems and what we expected might happen. At least we could have an outline of the
things we needed to consider because we might be putting together a pickup team to get
them done. We began the Desert Crossing planning based on this even though we weren’t
tasked with it.
When the decision was made to go into Iraq, this surprised the hell out of me because there
was no need to go into Iraq. Saddam was no threat to anybody, nobody was afraid of him,
and we had bigger fish to fry in Afghanistan. Then I saw Rumsfeld throw away the war plan.
He thought he could do it on the cheap, which really told me that the new plan was going to
exacerbate the problem tremendously because you were not going to have control of the
people, you were not going to have control of key facilities, you were not going to have
control of the borders, and all of this was going to come back to haunt you.
I called down to CENTCOM. I was retired, but I talked to the deputy commander. I told him,
“You guys are crazy.” First of all, the war plan that Rumsfeld was talking about involved far
too few troops, meaning we’d get overwhelmed, and that place was going to erupt in many
different ways, and we’d be unable to control it. And I said, one thing we needed to look at
was Desert Crossing because that would give us an idea of what to expect. He said he’d
never heard of Desert Crossing. We had worked on that plan up until I retired in October
2000. Whatever was done on that plan at CENTCOM afterward was completely blown off by
the leadership there.
You know, when you are retired, you don’t like to go back and poke around your last
command. I mean, it is just not done. However, a number of the staff that were still there
contacted me and told me about the plans they were being forced to put together, the troop
cuts, the assumptions being made—it was just going to be a disaster. And of course, it was.
My point in all of this is that in that Desert Crossing game, we had a specific objective in
mind—to learn what was going to happen. Let’s put together the best minds, the best
intelligence organizations, and we had every one of them there. They very accurately gave
us a picture that we had not put together before that. Unfortunately, it got lost in translation
and transition and amidst arrogant people that came into leadership at DoD and elsewhere.
Colin Powell understood it, but that’s not who President Bush listened to on this. We ignored
everything we learned from that game.
The COCOMs have very specific requirements they are looking at, as opposed to the
services that are looking more broadly at future capabilities. How does this impact the
effectiveness of the wargames and exercises they both conduct?
Zinni: The gaming with the COCOMs is very different from service-level gaming, which is
trying to validate or prove capabilities that the services want and need to get the budget for.
At the COCOMs, you are gaming war plans. That is basically what you do. In exercises and
in gaming, you usually have specific things you either want to test or learn, and they tend to
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be things you are testing or want to learn that affect a war plan or a contingency plan, or
something along those lines. And of course, having been a former COCOM commander, I’m
going to tell you that ours were honest, and the services’ were not.
However, sometimes when you bring allies in, you have to be a bit careful because, first of
all, intelligence sharing becomes a problem in some of these things, but you also don’t want
to embarrass allies. For us, to play a game and get defeated, we can take it as the result of
wanting to learn or test something. For some allies, that is politically unacceptable. They
were more into looking good coming out of the game, and that overrides learning. As
CENTCOM commander, in exercises and gaming, I worked very hard at trying to get our key
allies to embrace more free play. I found that the key was you have to get the top guys
onboard with that, because below that, they aren’t going to accept it unless they know they
can make mistakes and that will be okay. They may look bad and fail at something, but it is
supposed to be a learning event—rather than one where your main concern is about looking
bad in front of your boss. So, I think there is maybe more honesty in the gaming with
combatant commanders. That is sort of driven by how you are exercising real-world war
plans and operations. You can’t polish over or become pollyannish about something that isn’t
real, but there are times when you must be careful with that, like I said, with allies and when
you have a concern with intelligence sharing.
The other thing is you don’t want to take too much on in a game. I always felt you got more
out of the game or exercise if you had a specific handful of things you wanted to learn and
focus on, as opposed to trying to eat the big enchilada and do the whole war plan. That gets
too unmanageable, and it gets too diffused and diluted. If you look at specific parts of, say, a
plan or whatever you are trying to do, and pick five or six things you really want to focus on,
the game is much more meaningful.
How were you involved with the Millennium Challenge wargame?
Zinni: I was a senior mentor. Back in those days, Joint Forces Command wrote joint doctrine
and conducted joint training and joint wargaming. They brought in retired generals to be
senior mentors and to play the red team, as Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, USMC
(ret.) classically did with Millennium Challenge, when he exposed all the things we
mentioned earlier—trying to be too scripted or prove capabilities, rather than being true and
honest with open testing and free play.
They advertised Millennium Challenge as this super, all-time greatest military exercise game.
It was going to involve forces from all over the military. This was going to be a proof of
concept of the U.S. military writ large. They had a scenario, and they placed this big
emphasis on if we failed, that was fine. It was going to be completely free play, and we’d go
wherever it took us. Supposedly. Well, when I got there, I asked who was leading the red
team. They said Paul Van Riper, and I said, “You guys better have your stuff together
because you are going to die.” They kind of blew me off, like this was going to be a piece of
cake.
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They started the game, and there was a lot of media attention. After the first two or three
moves, Van Riper had sunk half of Fifth Fleet and destroyed a corps. They stopped the
game because it was now turning into a disaster. They brought everybody in and said they
were going to restart the game because some things didn’t go right or whatever. Van Riper
didn’t do what they thought or assumed he would do. They thought they had him figured out,
had the “enemy” figured out.
They started the game again—same result. Van Riper kicked their butts, and now they
stopped again. People were coming down from the Pentagon, and this was becoming a
problem. They then said they were going to start for a third time, but this time they told Van
Riper what he had to do. He said if they wanted him to go by a script, they had to advertise
that it was not free play—that it was scripted. You can’t advertise something as free play
when it is really being scripted—that is dishonest. They told him they were not going to do
that, but that Van Riper was going to be scripted in many of the things that he could do.
The next thing that happened was a bunch of the majors that were down there revolted and
went to the media, and of course Van Riper then became a superstar for every young officer
in the military. Malcolm Gladwell even wrote about it. This went all the way up to the Joint
Chiefs, and the Joint Chiefs dissed Van Riper and didn’t defend him. Van Riper became the
hero for everybody involved in Millennium Challenge below the rank of one-star.
Are we overreliant on technology for solutions? What are some potential pitfalls of
this approach?
Zinni: Yes, it is in our nature to become overreliant on technology because we created this
dependency on it, and in addition to that, in some ways, we don’t leverage it enough. Every
time I get into a discussion with someone about facing a peer-level military threat, it always
comes down to the same thing: Well, they’ve got missiles that are going to crush us. The
answer is always that we must go after those missiles, we must find them, and shoot them
down. What everybody is losing sight of is one of the first things I ask: How does the missile
know where you are? Then there’s a fall back: Tell me how they target you. The missile is
back there, and you are out here, and they can’t see you. Something is targeting you. Is it a
satellite? Is it a recon unit? Instead of wasting all this effort and resources on new technology
to kill the missiles, could we blind their missiles? Could we deceive the missile in some way?
Maybe the focus of our technology should be on defeating targeting, and maybe the ways we
defeat it is to give it a false image, to blind it, to deceive it. To address the threat through
better tactics, using what we already have. No one ever talks about that. Everybody just
pushes the technology to kill the missile. My point is that it is not just overrelying on
technology. Sometimes it is not knowing how to use technology through tactics to build an
advantage.
In Millennium Challenge, the blue force was totally dependent on monitoring the red team’s
communications, so Van Riper did not use any digital technology. He used motorcycle
couriers and all kinds of alternative, simple sources of communication. He did nothing that
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could be captured or intercepted, so they were totally blind. They put all their eggs—that they
would have superior technology to intercept his communications—in one basket. They
assumed he would never initiate the fight—that this enemy would be so overwhelmed he
would not attack during the build-up phase. Of course, Van Riper immediately attacked. It
was a beautiful thing to watch! When we make too many assumptions, it becomes a
vulnerability.
The Commandant of the Marine Corps recently published a new doctrinal publication
on competition. From your business experience, what are some lessons learned that
might be applicable to this new mindset that the service and DoD writ large are
adopting? What does it mean to compete with a peer threat below the level of an
actual conflict?
Zinni: In the business world, when you look at competition, you look at three things. When
you go after a contract or something, you bid on it and put a proposal out there. Your
reputation begins with that proposal. For the customers you are dealing with—let’s take the
defense industry, and you are dealing with the Defense Department and services you are
going to provide—you are going to be known by the quality of those proposals. If you have a
series of proposals that have flaws in them, you are going to get a bad reputation and soon
become uncompetitive. That’s how you first establish your reputation in a competitive sense.
Let me draw parallels with the military. Basically, what you are doing is you are putting out
proposals to allies and potential enemies. In other words, you are framing yourself. This is
going to be your reputation because if you can’t live up to it or have a reputation of claiming
things that don’t work or whatever, then you begin to lose credibility, and you begin to tempt
the enemy to test you.
You also need to realize you can’t compete across the entire spectrum. You need to identify
the signature capabilities that really make up the heart and soul of your company and build
your reputation around them. In a military sense, these are the things you must be the top in
—let’s say missile defense, or nukes, or whatever. There are certain things that are so critical
to your essence and what you are doing that you need to focus more on them.
The third thing, which is critically important in the business industry, is you need your best
people where you touch your customer or your client. In the business world, I want to make
sure I have people out there who have customer intimacy, familiarity, and trust. They are my
selling point. People want to come back to your company because of these people. Relating
this to the military: Who are your combatant commanders? Who are your senior generals?
Who do you put out there as military attachés, or the military people who are negotiating or
interacting with allies? If the enemy is in the Middle East, he is looking at the CENTCOM
commander, and your customers and allies are looking at that commander, too.
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One of the problems the military has is that capabilities are not centrally determined. Every
service, every service secretary, and every service chief fights for something, and we don’t
have a good way of looking at tradeoffs and risks. What happens is when there’s a budget
cut and you need to take risks, it is sort of salami-sliced across the DoD, and no one,
particularly at the top, has enough power to say we are going to do this, but not that. This
was Eisenhower’s complaint when he talked about the military industrial complex—the
military wants everything. They didn’t come to him saying we are going to take risks here,
and this is how we see the budget. He just had four services wanting everything. That
becomes part of the problem, particularly if you relate that to “signature capabilities.” You
must pick which ones are your signature capabilities and are most important for you not to
take risks in—and even more importantly, where you are willing to take risks, and what the
tradeoffs are.
In business, you measure yourself against what I call a competitive set. For example, say I
am on the board of a real estate investment trust that owns 12 hotels. We are basically a
small hotel company—a real estate investment trust. We have about a dozen competitors in
our peer competition set. You watch that set very carefully. Investors who are going to invest
at that level will look at you compared to the others. If you apply that to the military, peer
competitor means “the big guys” (Russia and China), but there are capabilities within our
military that are not necessarily designed to be about the big fight.
We don’t do so well in the “least likely” conflicts, like when we get caught up in the Iraqs,
Afghanistans, Somalias, and Vietnams. We don’t do well in that competitive set. I always say
you never fight the war you prepare for. Logically, you should prepare for the war you don’t
want to fight, but that means for all the others, you don’t have the perfect capability to
engage in them. Some of that is not military related; it is political will, which erodes over time
if you are not showing success. I think you saw that in Iraq and in Afghanistan.
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